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 Introduction 
 
 
On 10 December 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).1  The underlying intent was to create a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.2  While the UDHR itself is not 
legally binding, its principles set forth the foundation for nearly all, modern international human 
rights treatises.3  There is perhaps no greater challenge to the claimed ‘universality’ and 
enforceability of these principles, from a theoretical and practical perspective, than the 
Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK).4   
The DPRK has created a culture of pervasive impunity and lack of accountability for 
systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations within their territory.5   Respect for 
individual human rights, such as those rights that are defined within the UDHR, simply does not 
appear to exist within the DPRK.6  In contrast, implementation and enforcement of these very 
same rights have flourished within the Democratic Republic of South Korea.7  In order to 
understand this ideological divergence on the Korean peninsula, it is necessary to analyze the 
claimed universality of international human rights in relation to the current state of human rights 
within the DPRK.  This analysis highlights both the limitations of international human rights law 
as well as the importance of several political factors unique to the DPRK, impacting the 
suitability of such rights therein. 
                                                          
1 UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 10 DECEMBER 1948, 217 A (III), available 
at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html. 
2 Id. 
3 See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990). 
4 See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 
A/HRC/25/63, (7 February 2014) [hereinafter, HRC REPORT], available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoIDPRK/Report/A.HRC.25.63.doc. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOURTH PERIODIC REPORT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, UNITED NATIONS 
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, CCPR/C/KOR/CO/4, available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org. 
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 The remainder of this article is divided into three parts.  Part I addresses the universality 
of international human rights law, Part II focuses on national law and policies inherent within the 
DPRK impacting universal application therein.  Following this analysis, Part III will provide a 
quantitative analysis of the history and current state of international human rights within the 
DPRK.     
 
Part I:  The Universality of International Human Rights Law 
 
 
The system of international law in general, and international human rights law in 
particular, is no longer content with stating its principles; it wants them to be actually adhered to.8  
Underpinning international human rights law is the principle of universal applicability.  
Something that is universal relates to everyone in the world or everyone in a particular group or 
society.  As such, international human rights are those rights that relate to all human beings 
within the world.  Without universality, the nature and scope of these rights would remain 
relative to the culture in which they are implemented.  In order to ensure that these rights are 
actually adhered to, it is imperative to disentangle them from cultural considerations.  It is only 
when these rights are viewed as being prominent over cultural considerations that governments 
become compelled to implement them, in spite of cultural considerations.      
International organizations, such as the United Nations, have achieved tremendous 
success in prescribing international human rights.9  Regional organizations, such as the European 
Court of Human Rights, have become instrumental in adjudicating these rights.10  However, 
primary responsibility for the enforcement of these rights remains with the State parties 
                                                          
8 PHILLIPE DELMAS, THE ROSY FUTURE OF WAR (1997). 
9 See The 20th Anniversary of OHCHR—20 Human Rights Achievements, available at:  
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/OHCHR20_Backup/Pages/Achievements.aspx 
10 Leo F. Zwaak & Therese Cachia, The European Court of Human Rights: A Success Story?, HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF, 
VOL. 11, ISS. 3 [2004]. 
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 themselves.11  As such, if a State is either unwilling or unable to enforce these rights, it is a moot 
point as to whether or not they are universal in theory.   
The evolution of international human rights law can best be understood by analyzing 
three interrelated historical ideological debates.  The first, and perhaps most contentious debate, 
focuses on the relationship between these rights and the particular culture within the society in 
which they were implemented in.  The second debate centers on whether or not these rights are 
individual or collective in nature.  Finally, the third historical debate highlights the inherent 
tension between individual rights and individual duties within a particular society.   
 
A. Universalism versus Cultural Relativism 
 
 
According to the universalistic approach, international human rights treaties are nothing 
more than the codification and expansion of those rights previously identified as natural rights, 
representing the most effective response yet devised to a wide range of standard threats to 
human dignity.12   These rights, following the manifest literal sense of the term, are ordinarily 
understood to be the rights that one has simply because one is human.13  Moreover, human rights 
are often held to be universal in the sense that most societies and cultures have practiced human 
rights throughout most of their history.14   
Cultural relativism, in contrast to universalism, stands for the proposition that human 
rights are relative in nature to the particular culture that they are part of.15  Since cultures vary 
across time and space, human rights among those cultures vary as well.  In its purest form, 
                                                          
11 See UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS : RESOLUTION / 
ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 8 JANUARY 2008, A/RES/62/61, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/478f60c52.html. 
12 See Jack Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 281 (2007). 
13 Id., at 282. 
14 Id.at 284. 
15 JIYOUNG SONG, HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE IN NORTH KOREA:  POST-COLONIA, MARXIST, AND CONFUCIAN 
PERSPECTIVES 36 (Routledge 2011). 
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 cultural relativism can be defined as “the acknowledgment of equal validity of diverse patterns of 
life.”16   Since neither superiority nor inferiority exists when judging different cultural practices, 
the paramount consideration is for tolerance of those conventions that may differ from one’s 
own.17  Tolerance, unlike respect, “does not require wholly acknowledging or embracing other 
cultures within a society but only noninterference with others’ value systems and cultural 
practices.”18 
In the context of human rights, proponents of cultural relativism argue that respect for 
cultural differences must be taken into account in determining the suitability of a particular 
human rights norm within that particular culture.19  Critics of cultural relativism assail this 
theory as merely a convenient excuse for not advancing international human rights.20  In their 
opinion, “no culture or comprehensive doctrine is by nature, or in any given or fixed way, either 
compatible or incompatible with human rights.”21  In other words, since cultures are malleable in 
nature, there is nothing indigenous within a culture that would prevent a majority of its members 
from endorsing human rights, if they chose to do so.22 
 
B. Individual versus Collective Rights 
 
Underpinning the competing theories of universalism and cultural relativism is a fierce 
debate regarding the relative value of the individual over the collective body within a given 
society, as well as the primacy of individual rights over the individual’s duties to the state.  In a 
holistic sense, “human rights concerns the relationship between the individual and the state; it 
                                                          
16 Id. 
17 Id.    
18 Id. at 37. 
19 Id. 
20 See DONNELLY, supra note 13. 
21 Id. at 291. 
22 Id. 
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 involves the status, claims, and duties of the former in the jurisdiction of the latter.”23  There 
remains significant debate as to whether these rights apply to individuals, collective groups or 
both.  Cultures, such as the one within the DPRK, where identity and responsibility are seen as 
being collective, simply do not have the same understanding of the rights of the individual as 
cultures where identity and responsibility are viewed as belonging to the individual.24 
Individualists, refuting the notion of collective rights, argue that human rights are universal in 
nature and “are rights that belong to every human being in virtue of her or his common 
humanity [and] exist whether or not the government recognizes them.”25  As such, collective 
rights are usually little better than excuses for violating individual rights.26 
Broadening the concept of 'rights' to include collective groups will not only undermine the 
basic conception of rights, it threatens the distinction between human rights and legal rights.27  
To have any meaning then, human rights must be understood to exist independent and superior to 
the civil liberties rights guaranteed by the state itself.28  International human rights are 
revolutionary in nature because they “sweep away, in one fell swoop, all the grounds through 
which the subordination of some individuals, groups or categories of people to others had been 
justified.”29   By making rights individualistic in nature, international human rights law makes any 
claims based on rank, birth, and status inherently flawed in nature.   
Collective rights (also commonly referred to as group rights) are creatures of the state 
itself.30  As such, they “are created by association and lack the independent authority of 
                                                          
23 DONNELLY, supra note 13, at 285. 
24 DELMAS, supra note 9, at 119. 
25 SONG, supra note 16, at 41. 
26 Jin-Xue Fan, On the Two Sides of Human Rights, 9 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 79, 82 (2003). 
27 Id. 
28 Michael Goodhart, Origins and Universality in the Human Rights Debates: Cultural Essentialism and the 
Challenge of Globalization, 25 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 935, 946 (2003). 
29 Id. 
30 FAN, supra note 27. 
5
Gariepy: Human Rights in North Korea
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
 universal human rights.”31   Generally, “collective rights are not as favorably regarded simply 
because many people endorse first-order normative views according to which the interests of 
individual people are of over-riding importance and that individuals should not bear duties for 
the sake of collectivities.”32   Proponents of collective rights believe that “no one can acquire a 
right except as a member of a society in which some common good is recognized by all 
members.”33 
Marxist ideology, the epitome of a collective rights theory, reasoned that human rights 
are neither universal nor inherent.  Arguing that universal human rights within capitalistic 
regimes are illusory in nature, merely concealing inequality through formal and empty 
practices, Marx concludes that these regimes fail to uphold even the most basic of human rights 
of their citizens. 34  In contrast, within Marxist ideology, human rights are only guaranteed to 
members of the proletariat society who share the same goals as the surrounding society, the party, 
and ultimately the leader.”35 As such, it is membership not individualism within Marxist ideology 
that confers human rights.  Similarly, the North Korean Dictionary of the Works of the Great 
Leader Kim Il Sun incongruously defines individualism as an ideology of the exploitative 
class.”36   
Collectivism, on the other hand, is celebrated because it prioritizes collective interests in support 
of the collective struggle for society, the People, the Party and the revolution.”37   Such policies, 
promoting collective rights at the expense of individual rights, in turn promote individual duties 
at the expense of individual rights.  This is problematic because, as demonstrated by the history 
                                                          
31 Id. at 82. 
32 Leslie Green, Two Views of Collective Rights, 4 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 315 (1991). 
33 SONG, supra note 16, at 39. 
34 Eric Engle, Human Rights According to Marxism, 65 GUILD PRAC. 249 (2008). 
35 Id. 
36 DICTIONARY OF THE WORKS OF THE GREAT LEADER KIM IL SUNG, SCIENCE ENCYCLOPEDIA PRESS (1982). 
37 SONG, supra note 16, at 105.   
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 of the DPRK addressed below, promoting individual duties at the expense of individual rights 
can result in widespread and systemic human rights violations.    
 
C. Individual Rights versus Individual Duties 
 
Similarly, the relationship between individual rights and individual duties is rooted in a 
fundamental disagreement over the source of human rights.38  Individualists argue that, since 
humanity is the source of all human rights, these rights exist independent from civil liberties.39  
This is important because civil liberties, unlike human rights, can be stripped away by depriving 
an individual of his status within a particular society.  Malcolm X explained these relationships 
succinctly when he declared that civil liberties are things that you are asking ‘Uncle Sam’ to 
give you whilst human rights are things you were born with.40   
In contrast, the Soviet concept of human rights rested on the premise that “the interests of 
the state and the individual were coterminous, and that rights did not inhere in individuals by 
virtue of their humanity but derived from the state and reflected its stage of development.”41 
Simply put, “human rights could not be conceived outside the state.”42  While the importance of 
individual duties is clearly reflected in traditional Western philosophy, attempts to codify a 
Universal Declaration of Individual Responsibilities43 failed miserably.44  The concern was “that 
duties would be overpowering rather than complementary to rights, that they would be used as an 
alternative force for evil, rather than as an additional force for good.”45 
                                                          
38 See GREEN, supra note 33.    
39 Id. 
40 Barbara J. Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s (2014). 
41 SONG, supra note 16, at 165. 
42 Id. 
43 Inter-Action Council, A Universal Declaration of Responsibilities (Sept. 1, 1997), available at 
http://www.interactioncouncil.org/udhr/declaration/udhr.pdf. 
44 Jason Morgan-Foster, Third Generation Rights: What Islamic Law Can Teach the International Human Rights 
Movement, 8 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEV. L. J. 67 (2005). 
45 Id. at 81. 
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 While Christians often model their behavior after the Bible, North Koreans have been 
forced to seek guidance from the scripture of juche ideology, that is, the directions of Kim Il Sung 
and the words of Kim Jong-Il, so that they think and behave based upon their directions and 
words.46  In contrast to the Ten Commandments of the Christian faith, the Ten Great Principles 
regulate and judge every word and action of the people in North Korea.47  Officially announced 
by Kim Jong Il in 1974, these regulations govern the everyday lives of the North Korean 
people.48   As such, the underlying natural law foundation supporting individual rights has 
essentially been misappropriated by the DPRK in furtherance of the government's own political 
mandate.49  In order to understand how this occurred, it is necessary to gain a better 
understanding of the internal ideologies of the DPRK. 
 
Part II:  Understanding the DPRK 
 
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a nation formed via revolution and forged 
through war, remains an extraordinary historical anachronism that simply cannot be 
understood apart from his history.50   This miserable history, shaped by a brutal foreign occupation 
and never-ending fratricidal war, truly defined the ideology of the DPRK.51  The longevity and 
insolubility of the Korean conflict “makes it the best example in the world of how easy it is to 
get into a war and how hard it is to get out.”52  Following the Korean conflict, “Kim Il Sung 
cut his nation off from the world in search of an ancient Korean ideal, a self-sufficient Hermit 
                                                          
46 See Philo Kim, An Analysis of Religious Forms of Juche Ideology in comparison with Christianity, INT'L 
JOURNAL OF KOREAN UNIFICATION STUDIES, VOL. 11, NO. 1, 127, 138 (2002). 
47 Id.  
48 A listing of these principles is available at http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02900&num=10829.   
49 Id. 
50 See Johnathan D. Pollack, Korean Unification: Illusion or Aspiration?, 8 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 77, 79 (2001-
2002). 
51 Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (The New Press 2004). 
52 Id. at 3. 
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 Kingdom.”53   To achieve, and more importantly preserve this Kingdom, Kim Il Sung 
embraced the philosophy of Juche and the Songbun classification system.54  Each of these 
ideological tools, individually and collectively, have had a tremendous impact on the viability 
of human rights in the DPRK55 and will be addressed separately below.   
 
A. Juche 
 
Steeped in the Stalinist dogmas of the 1940's and 50's, the DPRK formed North Korea 
into a mature socialist society.56  By 1960, the DPRK broke with the former Soviet Union and 
began an anti-Soviet, pro-Chinese campaign.57  The DPRK was to become a political anomaly, 
becoming more and more illiberal and isolationist, clutching to Stalinist dogmas abandoned by 
all other communist regimes.58 The juche ideology of self-reliance was born out of this 
separatist campaign.59  An understanding of the origins, components and philosophical 
underpinnings of the juche ideology is essential to an understanding of the DPRK and its 
people.60  
 
To begin with, etymologically, ju means ‘being master of one’s body’, and che is ‘a 
body’ or ‘an entity’.61  As such, juche means ‘being master of one’s body’, which can be 
interpreted as ‘sovereign autonomy’, ‘self-determination’, or ‘self-reliance’.62  In 
addressing the significance of juche, Kim Il Sung explained that “establishing juche means, 
in a nutshell, being the master of revolution and reconstruction in one’s own country.”63   
                                                          
53 Id. at 150. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 SONG, supra note 16. 
57 CUMINGS, supra note 53. 
58 SONG, supra note 16. 
59 CUMINGS, supra note 53. 
60 Id. 
61 SONG, supra note 14, at 123. 
62 Id. 
63 Grace Lee, The Political Philosophy of Juche, STANFORD JOURNAL OF EAST ASIAN AFF., VOL. 3, NO. 1, 105, 105 
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 Correspondingly, juche requires “holding fast to an independent position, rejecting 
dependence on others, using one’s own brains, believing in one’s own strength, displaying 
the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance, and thus solving one’s own problems for oneself on 
one’s own responsibility under all circumstances.”64 
Drawing upon Confucian ideology, juche attempts to revive the state philosophy of 
independence espoused by the original Korea rulers.65   Thus, juche, the governing principle of 
all aspects of North Korean life and the ideological basis of all state policies, quickly gained the 
full authority of Kim Il Sung’s ‘god like’ status.66  Sung “successfully wielded the juche idea as 
a political shibboleth to evoke a fiercely nationalistic drive for North Korean independence and 
to justify policies of self-reliance and self-denial.”67 
From a human rights perspective, the fundamental problem with juche is that the term 
 
‘self’ within the notions of self-reliance and self-denial refers to the Nation as an indivisible and 
sacred entity and not the individual.68  In fact, “the notion that individuals are not worthy of living 
if they are deprived of their nation has been promoted so persuasively that complete loyalty to the 
nation is considered natural.”69  This is best personified by early DPRK human rights discourse 
which, under the collective principles of juche, declared that “everyone in North Korea enjoys a 
happy life with guaranteed political rights, no social vices, and no worries over food, clothes, or 
consumption, no joblessness, no homelessness, free medical treatment and free education.”70 
Having already “established the infallibility of the juche philosophy”71, the veracity of 
                                                          
(2003). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 110. 
66 Id., at 111. 
67 Id., at 105. 
68 Cumings, supra note 52, at 159. 
69 Id. 
70 Song, supra note 16, at 134. 
71 Lee, supra note 64, at 111. 
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 this claim simply becomes irrelevant.  This belief system, engrained within the North Korean 
psyche at the earliest age, makes them docile and loyal to Kim Il Sung even in the face of 
famines and energy crises that have devastated the country.72  While juche may help explain this 
docility, it is actually the songbun classification system that is most debilitating to the 
implementation of human rights within North Korean society.73  Songbun “has an impact on 
human rights in North Korea that is incalculable and interminable in its highly destructive and 
repressive effects on the vast multitude of the North Korean population.”74 
 
B. Songbun 
 
 
Songbun was initially implemented “as a social class restructuring to reverse the old 
Confucian feudal system of the Chosun Dynasty and Japanese colonialism [in order to] empower 
the working class.”75  Ironically, not only has songbun failed to achieve this goal, it has created 
unrenowned class differences within Korean society.76  Etymologically, songbun means 
“ingredients or material.”77  Therefore, the DPRK employs this word “to refer to one’s 
sociopolitical background.”78 
The DPRK equates an individual’s class status in relation to their perceived loyalty to the 
nation and supreme leader, instead of their social class.79 In order to achieve this goal, “the 
songbun system identifies, assesses, categorizes, and politically stratifies each North Korean 
resident as a political asset or liability to the socialist revolution and the regime in general and to 
                                                          
72 Id. 
73 Robert Collins, Marked for Life:  Songbun, North Korea’s Social Classification System (2012) 
available at https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_Songbun_Web.pdf. 
74 Id., at 1. 
75 Id. at 9. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 6. 
78 Id. 
79 SONG, supra note 16. 
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 the ruling Kim family specifically.”80  The DPRK officially divides the North Korean population 
into three classes with only those deemed loyal to the nation being entitled to human rights.81 
At the top of the social class structure is the haek-sim kyechung, or core class, which is embodied 
by twenty-five to thirty percent of the regime’s most favored individuals, i.e., political leaders, the 
military elite, and members of the Workers Party of Korea.82  Under the songbun system, this 
group, assessed by the regime to be loyal to the nation and the Kim regime, is clearly entitled to 
human rights.83
                                                          
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 104. 
82 Ralph Hassig & Kongdan Oh, THE HIDDEN PEOPLE OF NORTH KOREA:  EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE HERMIT KINGDOM 
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2009). 
83 Collins, supra note 74, at 7. 
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 Fifty percent of the population, such as technicians, teachers, and enlisted soldiers, 
belongs to the tong-yo kyechung, or wavering class.84   This class is determined to be of 
questionable loyalty to the regime and is entitled to human rights so long as they serve the 
regime well through proper economic and political performance.85  Based on their questionable 
loyalty, “the party assesses that constant ideological indoctrination is essential to maintaining the 
reliability of the wavering class.”86 
The bottom twenty-five to thirty percent of the North Korean population is the jok-tae 
kyechung, or hostile class.87   This class is comprised of individuals perceived as carrying 
‘political taint,’ including defectors, relatives of defectors, and former landowners and 
merchants.88  This class is assessed as “disloyal to the socialist revolution, the party, and its 
leadership, members of this class are regarded as enemy by the Kim regime, and they suffer 
the most traumatic victimization of the songbun system.”
 89  Members of the hostile class, as 
enemies of the regime, are not entitled to any human rights. 90  
Songbun is further broken down into two subcategories, chulsin songbun and sahoe 
songbun, with the former referring to the socio-economic background of an individual’s 
extended family, while the latter refers to an individual’s socio-political and economic 
performance and behavior.91  While an individual’s songbun is hereditary , since it can 
decrease based on perceived disloyalty to the Nation or ruling party, it is not completely static 
in nature.  92  For example, “conviction of a political crime— particularly slander against the 
                                                          
84 Ralph Hassig & Kongdan Oh, NORTH KOREA:  THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (2000). 
85 Collins, supra note 74, at 7. 
86 Id. 
87 Hassig & Oh, supra note 83, at 201. 
88 Hassig & Oh, supra note 83, at 133. 
89 Collins, supra note 74, at 7. 
90 Hassig & Oh, supra note 85. 
91 Id. 
92 Collins, supra note 74.   
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 Kim regime—will not only cause one’s songbun level to fall to rock bottom, but so will that of 
one’s family members up to third-degree relatives, which will last for generations.”93 
In contrast, while not impossible, “moving up in the songbun requires a lifetime of 
devotion to the Kim family regime, the party, and their teaching.”94   This vicious circle is 
precisely what makes songbun such an effective tool in preserving the status quo within the 
DPRK and North Korean society.95  This classification system, expressly denying the 
inherent dignity of the individual, “is by its very nature a violation of human rights.”96 
 
Part III:  The Current Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK 
 
 
In order to fully appreciate the scope and depravity of the DPRK’s violations of human 
rights within North Korea, it is important to first identify their international legal obligations. 
Currently, the DPRK is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (including the Optional Protocols), and is a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities.97 
These treaties, in contrast to the aspirational UDHR, are legally binding and the act of 
ratifying these treaties requires a certain degree of relinquishment of sovereignty on the part of the 
state.98   Ratifying these treaties obligates the DPRK to undertake steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, to achieve the full realization of the rights recognized 
                                                          
93 Id. at 7. 
94 Id. at 8. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 86. 
97 United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: Status of Ratification, 
available at: http://indicators.ohchr.org. 
98 See Morse H. Tan, State of Rightlessness: The Egregious Case of North Korea, 80 MISS L. J. 681, 687 (2010-2011). 
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 within each of these treaties.99   At a minimum, in accordance with customary international law100, 
the DPRK must refrain from ideological policies such as juche and songbun, which frustrate the 
intent and purpose of these treaties.101  As the recently released UN Human Rights Council report 
makes clear, the DPRK has failed to achieve even these minimal standards.102  In order to 
understand the depth of this failure, it is necessary to analyze the recently released United Nations 
Human Rights Council Report on North Korea, to determine whether or not juche and songbun 
constitute crimes against humanity.  
 
A. UN Human Rights Council Report on North Korea 
 
 
The Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the United Nations 
system made up of 47 States responsible for the promotion and protection of all human rights 
around the globe.103  On 21 March 2013, at its 22nd session, the United Nations Human Rights 
Council established the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK).104  Resolution A/HRC/RES/22/13 mandates the body to investigate 
the systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights in the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, with a view to ensuring full accountability, in particular for violations that 
may amount to crimes against humanity.105 The resulting report confirmed, “systematic, 
widespread and gross human rights violations have been and are being committed by the 
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 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”106   These violations included torture, inhumane 
treatment, arbitrary detention, denial of the right to life, limited freedom of movement, and 
enforced disappearances.107   The Human Rights Commission concluded, recognizing the 
influence of juche, that “the particular nature and the overall scale of human rights violations in 
the State can be more easily understood through an appreciation of the nature of its political 
system.”108 
Furthermore, songbun, according to the Commission, represents the “most important 
factor in determining where individuals are allowed to live; what sort of accommodation they 
have; what occupations they are assigned to; whether they are effectively able to attend school, 
in particular university; how much food they receive; and even whom they might marry.”109  
Additionally, songbun has resulted in a “socioeconomically and physically segregated society, 
where people considered politically loyal to the leadership can live and work in favorable 
locations, whereas families of persons who are considered politically suspect are relegated to 
marginalized areas.”110   The DPRK, adhering to the tenants of juche, have implemented nearly 
an absolute ban on foreign travel in violation of fundamental human rights.111   
 Notwithstanding the ban on travelling abroad, “nationals still take the risk of fleeing, 
mainly to China.”112  Former DPRK security officials, pursuant to a policy dating back to the 
early 1990s, may shoot to kill anyone attempting to cross the border.113   A former State Security 
Department (SSD) agent involved in border control indicated that border guards who shoot at 
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 DPRK citizens trying to flee the country are not punished.114   The SSD considers anyone who 
illegally flees to China to be a traitor, no matter their reason, and does not “treat them as 
human.”115  In turn, China continues to pursue a rigorous policy of forcibly repatriating citizens 
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who cross the border illegally, in contravention 
of its obligations under the 1951 Convention Related to the Status of Refugees and the 
Convention's 1967 Protocol.116 
As a result, North Korea’s border crossers are left heavily dependent on lawful residents 
in China willing to risk aid, vulnerable to exploitation by the human trafficking trade, and in 
constant danger of repatriation and brutal punishment by the DPRK regime.117  When repatriated, 
these individuals are subjected “to persecution, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention and, in 
some cases, sexual violence.”118   Juche and songbun, working together, thus create a vicious 
cycle of discrimination and violence amounting to crimes against humanity.119 
 
B.  Juche and Songbun May Constitute Crimes against Humanity 
Under international law, crimes against humanity “entail gross human rights violations of 
a scale and level of organization that shock the conscience of humanity.”120   Crimes against 
humanity require both a specific intent, as well as a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population.121  An attack is ‘widespread’ if it involves “massive, frequent, large 
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 scale action, carried out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a 
multiplicity of victims.”122   A ‘systematic attack’ requires “organized action, following a regular 
pattern, on the basis of a common policy and involves substantial public or private resources….  
[T]here must exist some form of preconceived plan or policy.”123   While theoretically some 
attacks can be classified as either widespread or systematic, in practice, there is significant 
overlap between these two categories.  Within North Korea, the DPRK has committed, and 
continues to commit, a wide variety of crimes satisfying these criteria.124    
C.  The United Nations Security Council—A Lost Opportunity 
On 18 December 2014, the United Nations General Assembly addressed the situation of 
human rights in the DPRK.125  The General Assembly condemned the long-standing and 
ongoing systematic, widespread and gross violations of human rights in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea and encouraged the United Nations Security Council to take appropriate 
action to ensure accountability.126  In response to this request, on 23 December 2014, the 
United Nations Security Council convened at an emergency meeting, to address the 
situation in the DPRK.127  During this meeting, Mr. Lie Jieyi of China, asserted that “the 
Security Council is not the forum designed for involvement in human rights issues, and 
still less should human rights issues be politicized.”128  Mr. Simonovic, representing the 
United Nations High Commissioners for Human Rights, responded by declaring that “real 
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 change in the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of Korea will not only 
require reform; it also demands justice.”129  Based on the nature of the allegations 
contained within the HRC Report, Mr. Simonovic concluded that it was the “international 
community’s responsibility to take action to prevent and punish such crimes.”130   
Chapter V of the United Nations Charter lays out the general powers and functions of 
the Security Council131. Article 24(1) of the UN Charter, confers on the Security Council, 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.132  Moreover, 
Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security 
Council.133  Under Chapter VII, the Security Council is tasked with the responsibility to 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and 
to decide what measures shall be taken in response thereto.134  Similarly, the Security Council is 
charged with investigating any dispute, or any situation that might lead to international friction 
or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or 
situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.135  
Maintaining peace and security is the Council's primary, but not only, mandate.136   
Promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, 
is a further purpose of the UN identified in Article 1 section 3 of the United Nations Charter.137  
The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
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 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), under Chapter VII powers, 
demonstrates the ability of the Security Council to establish and direct international criminal 
prosecutions, as a tool for promoting international peace and security.138   Following the entry 
into force of the Rome Statute in 2002,139  the authority to establish ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals has been replaced by Security Council’s ability to refer cases to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC).140  
Crimes against Humanity, such as those being committed by the DPRK, fall within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. 141   Unfortunately, the Human Rights Council lacks the authority to refer 
these crimes to the ICC,142  however, in accordance with Article 13 of the Rome Statute, the 
Security Council has authority to refer these crimes to the ICC for investigation and possible 
adjudication.143  Article 13 of the Rome Statute provides that the Court may exercise 
jurisdiction over statutory crimes referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the United Nations.144   The Security Council has exercised its authority to 
refer crimes to the ICC on several occasions, including the adoption of Security Council 
Resolutions 1593145 and 1970,146 referring the situations in Darfur, Sudan and Libya 
respectively.  The Security Council’s failure to refer the situation in North Korea to the ICC is 
simply inexcusable.  
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 Conclusion 
 
 
International scrutiny of the human rights situation within the DPRK has been far- 
reaching with minimal success.  Oscillating between carrots and sticks, efforts by the 
international human rights community to persuade the DPRK into protecting the human rights of 
their citizenry remain ineffective.  The HRC Report clearly demonstrates that this external 
pressure has had little impact on the DPRK.  While national authorities remain primarily 
responsible for safeguarding the human rights of their citizenry, when they manifestly fail to 
fulfill this responsibility, it is important to the credibility of the United Nations Security Council 
to make a referral of the situation to the ICC.147 
While international scrutiny has achieved some residual successes, such as coaxing 
border reform measures within the People’s Republic of China, focusing on the symptoms of the 
problem does little to ameliorate the problem itself.  As a result of the underlying ideologies of 
juche and songbun, coupled with Kimilsungism, meaningful human rights reform within North 
Korea must be internal in nature to have any chance of success.  Although the DPRK has ratified 
nearly all, major international human rights treaties148, incorporating many treaty provisions into 
the national constitution, they continue to selectively enforce these provisions based on an 
individual’s songbun status.149  This is important because, “to the extent that the law and the 
justice system serve to legitimize violations, there is a rule by law in the DPRK, but no rule of 
law, upheld by an independent and impartial judiciary.”150    Even where relevant checks have 
been incorporated into statutes, these can be disregarded with impunity.”151 
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 While the DPRK’s internal ideological framework is somewhat unique, historical 
similarities do exist.   For example, “the turning point for Marxism was the calcification of the 
communist party…when Marxism in practice became seen as the collective oppression of the 
individual, rather than as a force for liberation, the moral force of legitimation of that ideology 
was lost and thus its capacity for expansion was also lost.”96   In other words, when an “ideology 
of liberation that does not in fact liberate, but instead stagnates and oppresses…it loses all power 
of legitimation.”152  This highlights that “when the Soviet system degenerated into rule by the 
party, for the party, that system was doomed thereby.”153  The question remains whether or not 
the same fate awaits the DPRK. 
While international human rights are universal in nature, they are also fragile and 
susceptible to abuse by regimes such as the DPRK.  If international human rights are to flourish 
throughout the Korean Peninsula, the international community must remain resolute in their 
belief of universality and continue to hold the DPRK accountable for their violations. They 
must not question whether or not the pump of international human rights law works, but instead 
focus their collective efforts in prosecuting the DPRK for taking away its handle. 
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